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Congress or the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference.  
The results were not quite what we 
expected. Perhaps the biggest surprise, 
initially, was the extent to which the state 
is not a monolithic actor. In fact, from 
a certain perspective, there is no state. 
Instead, in China – probably as in other 
countries with federal governments – 
the government is a patchwork of over-
lapping jurisdictions and overlapping in-
terests. As a result, governmental bodies 
operating at different levels can exert dif-
ferent and even conflicting influences on 
corporate environmental practices.
In general, higher-level agencies 
are primarily rule makers and lower-
level bodies are mostly rule takers. At 
the mid-level, however, governmental 
bodies add hardly any environmental 
regulation of their own, which means 
that further down, the pressure tends 
to level off and even weaken. As the 
ancient saying goes, in the provinces, 
the mountains are high and the em-
peror is far away.
Selective enforcement
In the end, when it came to environ-
mental sustainability, our analysis 
One such aspect is the dynamic of en-
vironmental regulation. China’s gross 
domestic product has grown by more 
than 500 per cent since 1980, advanc-
ing from an economy a little larger 
than Canada’s to an economic super-
power. However, but this progress has 
come at the expense of the environ-
ment: in 2006, the country became the 
world’s largest emitter of greenhouse 
gases, and in 2009, the leading con-
sumer of non-renewable energy. At 
the same time, despite the fact that the 
government now has some tough en-
vironmental regulations on the books 
and controls up to 80 per cent of all 
businesses, it’s made relatively little 
environmental progress.
How can the government be the 
controlling shareholder and yet not 
exercise much control over its own 
companies’ conduct? To find out, we 
analysed quantitative data collected on 
Chinese firms between 2008 and 2012 
(specifically the 1,425 companies listed 
on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange, both of 
which since 2008 have mandated envi-
ronmental records), as well as qualita-
tive data on these companies collected 
in 2013-2014.
We analysed how administrative hi-
erarchical distance (the degree of dis-
tance from the central government 
and the level of government holding 
the control of the firm) affects the en-
vironmental regulation of the firm. Our 
study identified nine levels of adminis-
trative hierarchy in China, and assessed 
their impact on corporate environmen-
tal actions. In addition to state owner-
ship, our metrics included the level of 
government subsidy for environmental 
actions weighted against the revenue 
of the company, the numbers of times 
the company was reported to have vi-
olated an environmental regulation, 
and the percentage of top managers 
who also worked for governmental 
bodies, such as the National People’s 
“…governmental bodies operating 
at different levels can exert 
different and even conflicting 
influences on corporate 
environmental practices.”
Winston Churchill once described the Soviet Union as 'a riddle 
wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.’ Modern China is a very 
different story. By definition, the workings of the world’s largest 
economy (by purchasing power parity) can’t really be hidden from 
view nearly as easily. However, the sheer scale means that certain 
aspects of that vast market’s workings are still not all that easy 
to understand.
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he/she would point up and say, ‘she’s 
arranged by the top,’ and nobody 
would question the interview process 
anymore. In a more general sense, 
and in ways unimaginable in the West, 
Chinese firms consider themselves to 
be "grandsons" (sun zi, also meaning 
“being very subordinate”) of the gov-
ernment, and therefore subject to its 
(paternal) authority. Governmental 
bodies are considered to be like “par-
ents” or even “grandfathers” who have 
the authority to decide everything for 
the local area, much as senior mem-
bers do for a family in a feudal society. 
Our interviews similarly suggest 
that Chinese firms feel they have little 
influence over the content of new envi-
ronmental policies by the central gov-
ernment, even though there may be 
some room to bargain with local gov-
ernments over the pace and scope of 
their implementation.
For now, foreign investors com-
mitted to making sustainable invest-
ments in China should keep in mind 
suggested that two kinds of com-
panies tended to be the worst: very 
large national companies, which have 
some protection from the government, 
and locally controlled companies, 
which tend to have their own set of 
regional protectors. 
Not only are the laws enforced 
more selectively with respect to com-
panies the nearer their ownership is to 
entities in one the nine administrative 
strata we identified, but the govern-
ment incentives at each of these strata 
tends to favour companies whose own-
erships are rooted at that particular 
level. At the national level, for instance, 
the political and economic importance 
of the success of state champions such 
as Sinopec, the government oil compa-
ny, tends to encourage more selective 
enforcement actions. 
At the local level, leaders focus in a 
similar way on the economic growth 
of their region, both because they de-
pend on local revenues for economic 
development, and because most offi-
cials see local economic advancement 
as the key to political promotion. When 
lower-level governments control firms, 
officials tend to implement regulations 
only partially rather than pass up the 
jobs and revenue promised by the 
growth of the local firm. 
Another insight we gained from this 
study is how environmental protection 
evolves in a country where civil society 
is largely undeveloped. In China, the 
advocacy groups that act as a check on 
the private sector and government reg-
ulators in the West are either weaker or 
non-existent. In such a context, most 
of the mature market playbook regard-
ing how to prod companies to pursue 
environmental goals – such as stake-
holder dialogue, and the influence of 
non-governmental organisations – isn’t 
really applicable.
Instead, the society is extremely 
hierarchical. Our interviews taught us 
that individuals, organisations, and so-
ciety in general are constantly aware of 
the power of the administrative hierar-
chy. For example, Chinese managers 
and officials strive “to avoid troubles 
whenever possible” while they show 
deferential behaviour towards hierar-
chically superior individuals or organs.
Each time my co-author, who con-
ducted the interviews, was introduced 
by the CEO’s secretary to an interviewee, 
“…I suspect that the country won’t be able 
to focus on conservation until China’s 
next Five-Year Plan and President Xi or his 
successor puts a new plan in motion.”
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government’s 2017 annual report fo-
cuses on environmental protection, 
compared to one per cent in 1985. 
However, although the authorities rec-
ognise the environment as an impor-
tant issue, for now economic growth 
and combatting corruption remain 
higher priorities. 
Companies too are concerned. As 
one manager told us, ‘Although we 
are now more developed, pollution 
has intensified. Our minds are chang-
ing against this backdrop… It is, of 
course, difficult to fix it immediately… 
More promising outcomes may materi-
alise in three to five, or even 10, years.’
For what it’s worth, I suspect that 
the country won’t be able to focus on 
conservation until China’s next Five-
Year Plan and President Xi Jinping or his 
successor puts a new plan in motion. 
The good news, however, is that when 
China puts its foot down, the world 
trembles. As the success of the “tigers 
and flies” anti-corruption programme 
has demonstrated, the government 
the fact that the companies that tend 
to be the most compliant tended to be 
somewhere in the middle – companies 
that are too far from the central gov-
ernment to win any protection from 
the highest echelons, but also too far 
from local and provincial government 
to be favoured as a home team. These 
companies in the middle, at the bend 
of this inverted U, tend to have the best 
environmental record.
When will China go green?
Is any of this changing? Yes and no. 
For the sake of the planet and human-
kind, I certainly hope so. Certainly, the 
government is aware of the challenge: 
the amount of attention that it has paid 
to environmental issues in recent Five-
Year Plans has grown enormously over 
the past 15 years. In the 13th Five-Year 
Plan (2016), “Green Development” has 
been promoted to one of the five cru-
cial development concepts to facilitate 
building a prosperous society in China. 
Moreover, almost 12 per cent of the 
can move rapidly once it makes a com-
mitment. Once the government starts 
focusing more on environmental pro-
tection, the effects are likely to be 
felt everywhere.
Overall, I am moderately hopeful 
that China will do the right thing even-
tually. Whether that will happen soon 
enough for polar bears to still be stand-
ing on firm ice remains to be seen. 
This article draws its inspiration from the 
working paper Government’s green grip: 
multifaceted state influence on corporate 
environmental actions in China, written 
by Ruxi Wang, Frank H. Wijen and Pursey 
P.M.A.R Heugens.
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